Growing commercialization and competition in microfinance drives the focus of micro lenders from outreach per se to achieving financial sustainability in serving the poor. Such a goal can conflict with the traditional social mission of microfinance -outreach to the poor. In places where credit markets are inefficient, attaining financial sustainability while serving the poor depends largely on the ability of lenders to overcome the costs of market contracts and constraints. Such ability of cost containment often varies by lending terms and organizational forms. Using disaggregated data of microfinance providers in Ethiopia, we compared financial cooperatives and specialized or non-bank microfinance institutions on their outreach, financial performance and ability to achieve financial self-sufficiency together with outreach to the poor. The results show that nonbank microfinance providers perform relatively well in terms of breadth and depth of outreach, but face higher cost, which creates tension between outreach and financial sustainability. In contrast, there exists a positive complementarity between outreach and financial viability for financial cooperatives. On average, financially self-sufficient cooperatives lend small size loans and serve larger proportions of women borrowers, implying a greater depth of outreach together with achieving financial sustainability. While non-bank microfinance providers do better in expanding outreach, based on the findings, financial cooperatives better contain their costs, balance social and economic goals and enable the microfinance industry to fulfill its full promise -serving the poor on cost-covering basis.
Introduction
Making finance accessible to the poor is a crucial mechanism for poverty reduction and wealth creation in developing economies where there exists a huge unmet demand for financial services. So far, access to financial services by the poor from financial mainstream institutions is very limited 1 , mainly due to high costs of market contracts and constraints (Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper 2012; World Bank, 2008) . Microfinance has emerged as a dedicated pro-poor financial institution to lend uncollateralized and tailored loan terms to the unbanked poor in low-income communities. Through institutional innovations and innovative loan terms, microfinance institutions become able to dispense with information and enforcement costs and generate high repayment rates (Banerjee et al., 1994; Morduch, 1999) . Microfinance institutions demonstrate that the poor can borrow, pay substantial interest rates and save continuously, which in turn results greater optimism for improving credit markets in developing economies 2 .
However, the efforts of microfinance institutions to expand and perpetuate financial services to the poor are often backed by a steady flow of subsides (Morduch, 1999) . Providing financial services on a cost-covering basis and translating high repayment rates into profits remains a challenge not mastered yet. Besides the inherent costs of market contracts in micro lending, focus on outreach per se and dependence on noncommercial sources of funds, such as subsidies, 3 undermines the need for financial selfsufficiency in microfinance practices (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2010) . Recently, however, increasing regulations, commercialization and competition in microfinance has driven micro lenders to shift their focus from outreach and a reliance on donated funds to achieving financial sustainability-a demanding goal that requires the ability to cover costs out of the income generated.
A natural concern is, thus, the implications of shifting the focus towards financial viability on the traditional social mission of microfinance -outreach to the poor. Such a concern can be even greater in countries like Ethiopia where the financial market is less developed and microfinance institutions are promoted as a poverty reduction instrument (Amha, 2007) . As they are mainly promoted to extend financial services to the unbanked poor, failure to achieve wider breadth (scale) and deeper outreach in the pursuit of financial sustainability can be indeed a policy concern.
Theoretically, outreach to the poor and financial sustainability can be potentially either complementary or conflicting 4 . On the one hand, a focus on financial performance and efficiency can reduce excess costs and attract commercial funds (including voluntary savings), which may, at the same time, contribute to expand outreach. Once the institution becomes financially sustainable, it can mean wider outreach today, tomorrow and in the future (Christen, 2001; Frank, 2008; Rhyne and Otero, 2006) . On the other hand, striving for financial sustainability and efficiency can result in a shift in the composition of new clients at the cost of lending to the poor, as lending small and customized loan terms are very costly to maintain 5 . In other words, seeking financial sustainability can push microfinance institutions to crowd-out of their portfolio of lending the small size loans that are demanded by the poor (Hashemi and Rosenberg, 2006; Weiss and Montgomery, 2005; Woller and Schreiner, 2002) . Moreover, priority to achieve profitability can lead to higher interest rates and anti-social contract enforcement methods (Galariotis et al., 2011; Roberts, 2013) .
Despite its policy salience, there are very few systematic empirical works that analyze the potential trade-offs between outreach and financial sustainability. The evidence presented by these studies is mixed. Studies by Cull et al. (2007) and Hermes et al. (2011) found tensions between outreach to the poor and financial sustainability and efficiency. In their global analysis of microfinance providers, they found that institutions with lower average loan balance and more women borrowers are less financially sustainable. In particular, Cull et al. (2007) found that, for larger individual lenders, the pursuit of improved financial performance considerably reduces their focus on the poor. On the other hand, a recent study using data from 702 microfinance providers operating in 83 countries by Quayes (2012) documented a positive complementary relationship between depth of outreach and financial performance.
With the aims of expanding the body of existing empirical works, our study provides an in-depth analysis on how organizational form (i.e., the way ownership is organized and practiced) affects the potential compatibility or trade-offs between financial performance and outreach for microfinance providers in Ethiopia. We also examine patterns of profitability and variations in cost containment by organizational form (i.e., financial cooperatives vs. non-bank financial institutions (NBFI)), as it is equally important to know whether one type of organizational form is more cost effective than another in explaining differences in financial performance of lending institutions (Berger and Mester, 1997) .
To this end, we used disaggregated data of 107 microfinance providers to compare financial cooperatives and specialized NBFIs -the two prevailing microfinance providers in Ethiopia -on their outreach, financial performance, and ability to balance social and financial/economic goals. Considering both specialized microfinance and financial cooperatives enables us to reduce potential biases towards large and commercial firms and selection biases seen in prior studies 6 . Furthermore, our study aims at going beyond existing empirical works in measuring the outreach of the microfinance providers. In addition to average loan size and percentage of women borrowers that measures depth of outreach, we use average length of client relationships and time between installment payments as measures of length and scope of outreach, respectively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews organizational varieties of microfinance providers and their innovations to overcome costs of market contracts and constraints in micro lending. Section 3 describes the microfinance landscape in Ethiopia. Section 4 describes the data source and summary statistics. Section 5 explains the methodology used to understand the potential compatibility or trade-offs between outreach and financial performance. The analysis and results are presented in section 6. Section 7 concludes by summarizing the main findings and sets a recommendation.
Microfinance: organizational forms
The modalities of interventions towards addressing problems of credit/financial markets in low-income communities in the name of microfinance encompass a diverse range of organizational designs spawned by the common idea of lending to the unbanked poor. These range from public state-owned banks for SMEs (Small and Medium Size Enterprises) and social venture capital to private credit unions, financial cooperatives, specialized or private-for-profit microfinance institutions and village banks (Zeller and Johannsen, 2006) . All of these forms have varying degrees of ability to overcome costs of market contracts and constraints, which are partly intrinsic to their organizational design. In our comparisons hereunder, we examine the comparative advantage of the two most popular organizational forms, financial cooperatives and private-for-profit microfinance institutions, in terms of their inherent ability in reaching the poor and containing information and enforcement costs.
The microfinance practices of lending to individuals whom banks would spurn and tailoring the loan terms more closely to the needs of poor borrowers (e.g., farmers and laborers) were pioneered by the 19 th century German financial cooperatives 7 in credit markets that are similar to those found in many developing countries today (Guinnane, 2002; Guinnane, 2001a; Helms, 2006; World Bank, 2007) . The German financial cooperatives therefore were an early antecedent for the current microfinance revolution. They paved the way for lending policies and loan terms that catered for the needy and differed from conventional banks -they can be considered as institutional innovations in the financial sector 8 . In principle, financial cooperatives are local, autonomous or freestanding organizations owned and controlled by their members. They are self-help institutions established to made loans to members who cannot otherwise obtain credit from conventional banks. Financial cooperatives remain as major players in the microfinance industry and a dominant model in Western Europe 7 Credit cooperatives were first established in Germany during the 1840s by Schulze-Delitzsch and Raiffeisen. See Guinnane (2001a) for a detailed economic history of German credit cooperatives. 8 Enforcement of unlimited liability as an instrument to overcome any form of empathy and moral hazard was part of the innovation, which were strictly followed by the Raiffeisen model of credit cooperatives. Besides being an incentive to choose recipients of credit with care and to vigilantly monitor its use, pursuing unlimited liability also was used as a tool to continuously engage members in their cooperative (Emmons and Mueller, 1997; Guinnane, 2001a) .
and French-speaking Africa (Helms, 2006; Zeller and Johannsen, 2006 ). Currently they serve over 857 million people worldwide, 13 percent of the world population (ILO, 2012) .
Compared to conventional banks, the efficiency and success of financial cooperatives in lending uncollateralized loans rests on a combination of better information about borrowers, repeated interactions, and their ability to use sanctions against default that are not available to banks (Banerjee et al., 1994) . In most cases, they are established by people who live in the same communities, so that members know each other's habits, characters, abilities and creditworthiness. Having this information about fellow members, people could impose a wide variety of economic and social sanctions on one another. Unlike bank clients, members in cooperatives act both as borrowers and lenders, providing both the demand for and supply of loanable funds. Such dual roles or heterogeneity is also the sources of credible incentives or compulsion for members to monitor each other (Smith et al., 1981) . In other words, the need for continuous access for loans push borrowers to exert maximum efforts and the fear of losing their saving encourage depositors to be actively involved in screening potential borrowers and in monitoring those who had received loans. Equally important is that social sanctions within the community available for cooperatives in case of defaults by their members (Banerjee et al., 1994; Guinnane, 2001a) .
Despite their ability to overcome information and enforcement problems through capitalizing on local information and imposing inexpensive but effective sanctions, financial cooperatives can be challenging to run. They may entail considerable costs of ownership, as members should continuously save and commit to helping the institution operate. As they do not pursue the traditional bank-client relationship, in order to borrow, members should continuously save. Experience tells us that members often disappear when they are unable to perpetuate their savings in the cooperative due to economic reversals. Hence, financial cooperatives can be fragile due to their thin capital base (i.e., being highly dependent on local resources) and limited options for risk diversification (Adams, 1995; Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2010) . Nonetheless, financial cooperatives that strictly follow rules requiring them to keep aside a fraction of profits as indivisible assets can be resilient to members' economic reversals.
The second and most popular institutional form for lending small, uncollateralized and tailored loans are the specialized or private-for-profit microfinance institutions 9 , which we call non-bank financial institutions (NBFI) in this paper. Their roots can be found in many places, but a typical example is the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and its replicas, which have received considerable attentions over the last three decades. They emerged during 1980s and spread all over the world with the premise that the existing lending mechanisms of conventional banks are not pro-poor or highly constrained by local resources (e.g., financial cooperatives and informal credit market). They are the dominant models in Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe and Middle East and Northern Africa (Helms, 2006) . As of 2010, 3,652 specialized microfinance institutions reported reaching over 205 million clients worldwide, of which about 65 percent were among the poorest when they took their first loan (Microcredit Summit Campaign, 2012) .
Building on the experiences of financial cooperatives, NBFIs opened up with the discovery of 'joint liability' that harnesses social collateral and strengthens and expands the role of the group in microfinance (Morduch, 1999) . Joint liability lending was an innovation of NBFIs, which enable borrowers to self-select 10 on their own and avoid risky borrowers in their credit group using their local knowledge. Such a mechanism helps them to overcome ex ante moral hazards at lower costs by inducing borrowers to monitor each other's choice of project to which to apply the borrowed funds and impose sanctions upon borrowers who have chosen excessively risky projects (Stiglitz, 1990) . It can also reduce ex post default risks in the presence of dynamic incentives (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999) . In its strict sense, joint liability lending is a transfer of default risks from lenders to borrowers.
The success of NBFIs in overcoming information and enforcement costs also rests on their ability to use progressive lending 11 both as screening mechanism and as a tool to discourage strategic defaults. Starting with very small loans and gradually increasing loan sizes as borrowers demonstrate reliability enable them to systematically increase the opportunity cost of non-repayments (Besley, 1995; Galariotis et al. 2011; Tedeschi, 2005) . Equally important in the design of NBFIs is to dispense with repayment risks by using a repayment schedule that starts shortly after the disbursal of the initial loan and changes the nature of the risk for lenders (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2010) .
Besides the loan terms and types of innovations noted above, the fundamental differences between the two-microfinance providers considered in this study are their ownership structure and approach. Financial cooperatives are member-based organizations and saving-led in their approach. In contrast, specialized or non-bank microfinance are not member-owned and credit precedes saving. The other major differences between financial cooperatives and NBFIs are the source of loanable funds and its implication on their ability to overcome the costs of market contracts and constraints. Unlike financial cooperatives, which are self-supporting by their nature and serve large number of depositors, NBFIs are commonly attached to international donor agencies and rely on outside sources of capital.
Hypothetically, microfinance institutions based on extensive outside financial sources can be less effective in overcoming ex post moral hazards. For instance, the group can collude against the lenders by collectively deciding not to repay or to avoid imposing social sanctions on one another (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2010) . In the case of credit cooperatives, however, the member's fear of losing their savings deposits (and his/her deposits and the deposits of relatives) mentioned above prevents or sharply reduce the possibility of conspiring against the cooperative. Moreover, despite its limits on diversification of risks, being confined to small communities places financial cooperatives at an advantage in terms of capitalizing on borrowers' local knowledge. NBFIs, however, cover wider areas and borrowers have less chance to observe each other's effort level, especially in urban areas where getting to know each other is imperfect.
The possible distinctions between these two forms of microfinance institutions in terms of serving the poor while maintaining their financial viability is a topic less studied, mainly due to a dearth of data. The understanding is that both forms of microfinance institutions make financial services accessible for a considerable proportion of the poor and female populations in the world. In relative terms, the roles of NBFIs, in particular, are well recognized by international development organizations and donor agencies, as they are the big-push behind their revolution. What is less obvious for policy makers is the extent and depth of outreach of financial cooperatives. Implicit or explicit in much of the policy and academic literature on financial cooperatives is the notion that they are meant for unbanked middle-income clients and have limited outreach only to their members. However, studies by Lapenu and Zeller (2002) and World Bank (2007) shows that the scale and depth of outreach and pace of adaptability by financial cooperatives are comparable with NBFIs, and even higher in some contexts 12 .
While they may be similar in terms of scale and depth of outreach, so far there is no comparison of financial cooperatives and specialized microfinance in their financial viability and ability of achieving financial sustainability in serving the poor. Theoretically, financial cooperatives are assumed to be financially self-sufficient and sustainable, as they largely depend on member savings for lending. Moreover, they are at an advantage in terms of overcoming costs of market contracts and constraints (Mershland, 2008) . However, this does not mean that financial cooperatives are always cost efficient, as they may bear higher ownership costs 13 than NBFIs and are constrained by local resources and limited opportunity for risk diversification (Hansmann, 1996) .
With regard to specialized microfinance institutions, conventionally, outreach to the poor is their principal focus -achieving financial viability while serving the poor was considered as unattainable, and constitutes an inherent challenge to micro lending. Despite potential trade-offs with their traditional social missions, the recent commercialization of specialized microfinance institutions driven by the need for financial self-sufficiency results in a greater optimism for this form of microfinance. In order to reduce such knowledge gaps, our study aims at comparing financial cooperatives and NBFIs in Ethiopia based on their ability of achieving financial selfsufficiency together with serving the poor. (Turtiainen, 2008; . 13 Although ownership costs are intrinsic and cannot be completely neutralized by either of the two organizational forms, ownership costs related to capital efficiency can be higher for financial cooperatives due to capital 'lock in' and the indivisibility of assets (Mershland, 2008) .
The microfinance industry in Ethiopia
In Ethiopia, mainstream commercial financial institutions are not only unwilling, but they also lack the capacity to serve the needs of the poor (Amha, 2007) . Financial services to the poor are largely delivered by the microfinance industry, which is mainly made up of services rendered by financial cooperatives, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and NBFIs. Financial cooperatives are the forerunners in delivering financial services for the poor excluded by conventional financial institutions. Financial cooperatives in Ethiopia are notable both in lending small uncollateralized loans, saving mobilization, and in inculcating the importance of financial services in the society at large (Degefe and Nega, 2000) . Despite a weakening of cooperative activities in the country during the economic reforms in the early1990s, financial cooperatives were also among the most resilient cooperative institutions and generally survived the reform and have grown steadily subsequently. As shown in Figure 1 , the spread of financial cooperatives has grown over the period since 1974. It grows sharply from 2003 onwards, right after the establishment of the Federal Cooperative Commission, a public body organized with the aim of revitalizing cooperative businesses in the country. Currently, about 42 saving and credit unions and over 7,000 primary saving and credit cooperatives reportedly are providing microfinance services (i.e., saving, loan and insurance) for about one million members in the country (Federal Cooperatives Agency, 2012) . Similar to most credit cooperatives elsewhere, financial cooperatives in Ethiopia are organized by individuals (i.e., farmers, laborers, employees, etc.) working or living in the same localities. They mainly use standard bilateral lending contracts between the cooperative and a member borrower. Liability for repaying the loan rests with the individual borrower and the co-signer, who is also a member of the same cooperative. In most cases, the savings of the borrower and the co-signer serve as a guarantee -these financial cooperatives are savings-led in their approach, as noted earlier.
Besides the role played by financial cooperatives, the development of microfinance in Ethiopia also counts on efforts made by international NGOs, local NGOs, and government credit programs that integrate credit services in their development and relief schemes to bring sustainable improvement to the welfare of their beneficiaries. History teaches us that the involvements of the government and NGOs in credit delivery have been encouraging in terms of poverty reduction. Nevertheless, poor financial discipline and distorted resource allocation by NGOs and government credit programs have been equally substantial. Interest rate subsidies, debt write-off, and equating loans with humanitarian assistances by the NGOs were among the distortions which have indoctrinated a bad credit culture -a culture of entitlement -that undermines the development micro-credit markets in Ethiopia today (Amha, 2007; Degefe and Nega, 2000) .
Following the economic reform in 1991, some of the NGO and government pilot credit programs engaged in financial intermediation transformed into formal (specialized or non-bank) microfinance institutions. The transformation was made mainly to reverse the bad credit culture instituted by NGOs and state credit programs. This was done through establishing efficient microfinance institutions that adhere to the market mechanism while serving the poor. Nonetheless, the involvement of regional governments and mother NGOs as contributors of ownership equity that impacts decision-making powers is still prevalent. In addition to the NBFIs evolved from prior NGOs and government credit programs, the industry also witnessed new start-ups of investor-owned microfinance providers. They account for about 40 percent of the total. As of 2011, a total of 30 NBFIs in Ethiopia reported reaching over 2.3 million clients, with total loans outstanding of 6.5 billion birr -about $365 million ( Figure 1 ).
NBFIs in Ethiopia are share companies that are registered and regulated by the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE). They are owned by individuals, public bodies, or mother NGOs or by a combination of the three. Most of them are commercial lenders that aim at achieving financial self-sufficiency while serving the poor. Unlike credit unions or financial cooperatives, which are confined to specific locations, NBFIs cover wider areas of operation, such as entire regions. NBFIs use both bilateral individual lending contracts and contracts based on joint liability. In the case of group lending, which is the main lending contract of NBFIs in Ethiopia, loans are made to individuals, but the group that is formed by the borrowers shoulder responsibility for a loan if one among the group members defaults.
In spite of the prominence and wide prevalence of both types of microfinance institutions in the country, empirical work on their outreach, financial performance, and impact are scarce. Except the work by Berhane and Gardebroek (2010) and Liverpool and Winter-Nelson (2010) , the existing research is based either on anecdotes or on very small samples. While the samples used in these two studies still overlooked financial cooperatives, they systematically documented a positive impact of specialized microfinance on borrower's income, consumption, and housing. With the purpose of bridging the knowledge gap on the institutional performance of microfinance, our study aims at understanding the extent of outreach, financial performance, and interactions of the two types of institutions from an organizational point of view based on disaggregated data that encompass both specialized microfinance institutions and financial cooperatives.
Data and summary statistics
As described by Cull et al. (2007) and Morduch (1999) , in the microfinance industry, uniformity of products provided by lenders (i.e., lack of variations in contracts, interest rates, loan size, etc.) and homogeneity in institutional structure and size make it difficult for researchers to systematically assess the effects of products and institutional changes on social and economic outcomes. The data here, which include both specialized microfinance institutions and financial cooperatives, however, offer considerable variations in institutional structure, size, loan terms, contractual types, prices and costs, and risk-mitigating strategies. Such variation enables us to describe patterns of institutional change and their effects on financial performance, cost containment, and depth of outreach.
We used primary data collected from microfinance providers in Ethiopia between April and June 2012 14 . After dropping institutions with missing data points, we have data for 107 microfinance institutions. This includes all NBFIs in Ethiopia, which are 30 in number, and 77 financial cooperatives that account for about nine percent of the total number of financial cooperatives in the country. In the case of financial cooperatives, the dataset is not representative of all such institutions. The selection of financial cooperatives were mainly based on the auditing status of the institution, with those selected being those that were audited during 2011 and have an audit report for 2010. However, most financial cooperatives are not audited every year due to the limited capacity of the supervisory authority 15 . The availability of the audit reports for prior year enables us to get reliable historical financial data for calculating some of our variables of interest (e.g., average assets, average equity, average loan outstanding, etc.). In spite of the small proportion of financial cooperatives included in our analysis, when combined with the NBFIs, however, the institutions in the dataset serve the majority of microfinance clients in the country.
14 The data was collected through structured interviews. Table 1 presents summary statistics by organizational form on financial performance indicators, outreach variables and other control covariates used in the analysis for the microfinance institutions in our dataset. On average, the microfinance institutions considered are marginally financially self-sufficient (i.e., 1.03). However, when we disaggregate this by organizational form, we found that NBFIs are not financially selfsufficient, on average. Financial cooperatives, on the other hand, are able to generate sufficient revenues to cover their costs, although their return to assets is significantly lower than that for NBFIs. The possible explanations behind such disparities can be loan sizes, cost of loans, and loan-loss expenses. The summary statistics at the middle of Table 1 indicates that, on average, financial cooperatives spend less for both personnel and capital expenditures relative to their assets. The costs of capital and labor and loan-loss expenses are higher for NBFIs, with the difference with financial cooperatives being statistically significantly. Another measure of cost efficiency, cost per unit of birr 16 lent, further indicates that financial cooperatives incur lower costs per unit of currency lent compared to NBFIs. Besides lower capital and labor costs, this could be in part due to differences in loan sizes or target markets.
The outreach indicators suggest that NBFIs cater more to poor borrowers relative to financial cooperatives. On average, NBFIs offer lower loan sizes with short and frequent repayment schedules (suggesting a wider scope of outreach) and serve a higher proportion of women clients. The difference in loan sizes, however, can be due to differences in breadth of outreach and length of client relationships. As shown at the bottom of Table 1 , financial cooperatives are characterized by limited breadth, but have repeated interactions with their borrowers (i.e., longer relation with their members, as measured by average number of borrowings). Financial cooperatives in the sample serve a smaller set of members compared to NBFIs, -247 to 70,397, respectively. This difference on breadth of outreach is expected, because financial cooperatives in Ethiopia are confined to a particular location or communities by their nature. And their breadth can be further constrained by local resources, as they have limited sources of capital compared to NBFIs -they heavily rely on members' equity and deposits for lending. NBFIs, on the other hand, are at an advantage in attracting various sources of capital and cover wider areas of operations (e.g., regional states).
The summary statistics in Table 1 also show statistically significant differences by organizational form in the interest rates charged. The costs of loans are found to be considerably higher for NBFIs. On average, they charge 19 percent on a flat basis, compared to the 9.6 percent interest rates charged by financial cooperatives. This difference can be due to differences in the costs of loans -the higher the cost of the loans, the higher the prices. Besides, the conventional measure of risk-taking (i.e., equity-to-assets ratio) show that financial cooperatives are less leveraged, indicating lower costs of capital. They use a higher proportion of their own equities to finance their assets. NBFIs, on the other hand, are found to be risk-taking in their strategies, as measured by the extent of loan-loss reserves and equity-to-assets ratio. Moreover, NBFIs rely on grants for lending -on average 21 percent of their loans come from donations. Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNP). They are categorized in a single group due to small population of microfinance providers in all the regions, with the exception of Tigray and SNNP. In Tigray and SNNP we have collected data from considerable number of microfinance providers. However, we consider only NBFIs and drop all financial cooperatives from our sample due to data quality problems, which had to do with problems in data collection.
Tab. 1 -Descriptive statistics by organizational form
Source: Authors' calculations, based on primary data collected between April and June 2012.
In our sample, the two providers of microfinance also differ in size (i.e., measured in total assets) and equity capital ownership that renders decision-making powers more diffuse. Financial cooperatives are relatively small in sizes and individual members own equity capital. NBFIs, on the other hand, are bigger and their equity capital is owned either by individual investors, NGOs, or regional governments. There are also cases where ownership equity is contributed by a combination of the three. Based on ownership of the majority of the shares (i.e., more than 70 percent) NGOs and regional states owned 27 and 33 percent of the NBFIs surveyed, respectively. Individual investors own the remaining 40 percent of NBFIs.
Overall, our sample is reasonably balanced across regional states. 28 percent of the institutions are in Amhara region, another 32 percent in Oromia region. Institutions from regions other than Amhara, Oromia, and Addis Ababa comprise 11 percent of the sample. The remaining 39 percent are from Addis Ababa, where most of NBFIs and financial cooperatives are located. However, when we disaggregate by organizational form, the majority of NBFIs are found to be from Addis Ababa and financial cooperatives from Amhara and Oromia regions. Figure 2 shows that patterns of revenues, prices, and costs vary systematically by organizational form. As already indicated, despite their access to cheaper financial capital, on average NBFIs charge the highest prices and incur the highest average costs, as measured by Operational Expense Ratio (OER), which is the ratio of total expenses over total assets. Our measure of interest rates, however, captures only direct interest charges and we presume that the price charged could be even higher if we account additional fees charged by NBFIs, for which we do not have the data. Since costs prevail slightly over the interest rates charged, significantly lower returns on assets relative to prices results. Financial cooperatives, conversely, charge lower interest rates and face lower operational costs, resulting in higher returns relative to the prices of loans.
These patterns points to cost containment differences between the two groups of lenders. Costs are higher for NBFIs and results in higher interest rates for their borrowers. On the other hand, costs and interest rate charged by financial cooperatives are significantly lower and the difference is statistically significant. The possible explanation for this is that, in relative terms, the NBFIs cater for poor and female borrowers, which entails higher costs than financial cooperatives. In all, the results from the summary statistics imply differences in cost-efficiency and target markets between the NBFIs and financial cooperatives.
Empirical approach
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression is used to describe the correlates of profitability, total costs of lending, and outreach of microfinance institutions. It is mainly used to understand why some microfinance providers are more financially sustainable than others and to examine which organizational form is able to achieve financial self-sufficiency together with serving the poor. We allow factors of interest to vary by lender organization type in order to understand the extent of variation in profitability and cost containment relative to the scope and depth of outreach by organizational form, which are the primary objectives of this study. The reduced-form of the regression model is as follows:
Where i y is a dependent variable -profitability, total cost and outreach here -i x is a factor we allow to vary by organizational form (e.g., interest rates in the profitability regression and financial self-sufficiency in the outreach-sustainability regression), i D is organizational dummy and
is a function that contains control variables about the history, orientation, ownership and location of the microfinance providers.
We use different specifications for correlates of profitability, cost, and outreach. The first specifications on profitability and total costs are a benchmark regression that describes the question we raised above -why some microfinance institutions are more profitable than others -focusing on the role of interest rates, lending expenses, loan sizes, and organizational form. For the specification of profitability, we use a modified version of the models employed by Cull et al. (2007) and Quayes (2012) , which define financial self-sufficiency mainly as a function of prices, costs, history, and orientation of lenders. The empirical profitability function estimated is specified as follows: FSS represent the financial self-sufficiency ratio of microfinance institution i. It is one among the profitability indicators used to measure the financial performance of microfinance institutions. We also use Operational Self-Sufficiency (OSS) and Return on Assets (ROA) as additional measures of profitability. The correlation matrix in Table A1 shows that our measures of profitability are interdependent. Their descriptions and summary statistics are presented in Table 1 and Table A1 . The summary statistics are within the expected ranges, although with a wide range between the maximum and minimum values. We use robust regression methods to ensure the robustness of the results to possible outliers.
Yield is a measure of interest rates or the price of loans charged by the microfinance institution. Our measure captures only direct interest rates charged by lenders. It neither includes additional fees charged nor is adjusted for loan losses. As shown in Table 1 , the price of loans largely varies by organizational form. As a result, we allow Yield to vary by organizational designs. Hence, the coefficient of the interaction term, β 2 , shows how the effect of Yield varies by organizational type. As NBFIs are omitted for reference, the difference between β 2 and β 1 is a Yield coefficient for financial cooperatives. Thus, β 1 is the effect of yields on financial self-sufficiency of NBFIs.
CapitalCost and LabourCost measures the effects of personnel and capital expenditures relative to assets on the lender's level of financial self-sufficiency. The constructions and summary statistics of these measures appear in Table A1 and Table 1 . Besides its interaction with yields, the organizational form dummy, OrgForm, also enters the model independently (i.e., OrgForm =1 if the organization is a financial cooperative, 0 otherwise). We do not have a parallel coefficient for NBFIs, as they are the omitted category.
The matrix History includes two common measures of organizational backgroundsage (measured by number of years since founding) and size (measured by total assets) of the microfinance institution. The matrix Orientation includes variables that describe the lenders level of risk taking and extent of dependency on grants to sustain lending. The variables it contains are loan to assets and donation over loan portfolio ratios. Outreach comprises proxy indicators of client or member poverty levels (i.e., average loan size, percentage of women borrowers) and a variable that measures the length of outreach based on average length of client relationships with the microfinance institution. Region is a dummy variable for each major regional states and regions that come under the 'Other regions' category, with Addis Ababa as the omitted reference group.
The second benchmark regression relates total cost per unit of currency lent to average loan sizes of the microfinance institution. Understanding the effect of expanding loan sizes on cost of loans and how this effect varies across organizational form are the empirical questions. The regression model correlates the cost of loans with average loan size and other control variables. It is specified as follows: where TC is total cost of loans of microfinance institution i. It is a ratio of total operating costs during the period over total amount of loan outstanding. We also use capital costs and labour costs as dependent variables. LoanSize is the average loan size of lenders (i.e., total loan outstanding divided by total number of active borrowers relative to regional income per capita). We allow this variable to vary by organizational form and the interpretation of the coefficient is similar to that of Yield discussed above. In the results table of the total cost regression that follows, we also include the squared average loan size to capture potential non-linear effects. Donation is the amount of grants to loans over the gross loan portfolio of the institution. History, Outreach and Region matrixes are as defined above in the profitability regression.
The main regression model relates outreach and profitability of microfinance institutions in our sample. It analyzes the relationship between depth of outreach and financial selfsufficiency using a variety of outreach proxy measures as dependent variables. Can microfinance institution be profitable while serving the poor and which organizational form is relatively at a better position in balancing the two bottom-lines are the issues put forward. The specification of the model is as follows: where LS is average loan size relative to regional income per capita for microfinance institution i. It is a widely used measure of depth of outreach in the microfinance literature. As noted above, we also use other proxy measures of outreach, which includes percentage of women borrowers, percentage of rural borrowers, and time between installment payments as a measure of outreach scope 17 . FSS is financial selfsufficiency that measures the ability of a microfinance institution to generate sufficient revenues to cover its costs. As is clear from the model, we allow FSS to vary by organizational form in order to understand differences by organizational form in achieving financial viability together with outreach to the poor. Thus, the coefficient of the interaction term, β 2 , shows how the effect of FSS varies by organizational types. As NBFIs are the omitted category, the difference between β 2 and β 1 is a FSS coefficient for financial cooperatives. β 1 is therefore the effect of financial self-sufficiency on outreach of NBFIs.
The interaction coefficients β 5 and β 7 shows how the effects on outreach of age and institutional size vary across organizational forms. The coefficient vectors β 4 and β 6 , on the other hand, summarize the effects of age and institutional size on outreach for NBFIs. The variable Donation and Length measures the amount of grants received to loans and the average length of client relations with the microfinance institution, respectively. Ownership is a matrix of dummy variables for individual-and NGO-owned microfinance institutions, with government-owned institutions as the omitted category.
Region is a matrix of regional dummies as defined in the preceding models.
17 Scope of outreach measures the number of types of financial contracts provided by microfinance institutions. It includes both contracts between products (i.e., loan and saving) and within products (i.e., individual and group contracts), Schreiner, M. (2002) . We measure scope based on loan repayment terms for two reasons. One, as all microfinance institution in our sample provide both loan and saving services and individual and group contracts and therefore no variability to systematically distinguish the effects of types of products on financial performance. Two, the frequency of repayment schedules can matter most if microfinance institutions are concerned with the welfare of their clients. While it inculcate fiscal disciplines for better repayment behavior, for borrowers engaged in seasonal activities and variable income, more frequent repayment schedules can result in over-borrowing, sale of productive assets and failure to smooth consumption (Fischer and Ghatak, 2009 ).
Estimation results and discussions

. Financial performance
The summary statistics in the preceding sections shows that the financial performance of the microfinance institutions in our sample is encouraging. It indicates that over half of the institutions are profitable and, on average, all are financially self-sufficient -that is, they generate sufficient revenues to cover costs. However, patterns of financial viability vary considerably when we distinguish the sample by organizational form. The level of financial viability turns out to be below the cost-covering line for NBFIs, indicating that NBFIs, on average, are not financially self-sufficient. In contrast, financial cooperatives remain financially viable after disaggregation. This section further analyze the correlates of profitability with a greater emphasis on prices and costs of loans charged and incurred by lenders and their varying effects on profitability by organizational form. Table 2 summarizes the results from the estimation given under equation (2), which examines the relationship between profitability and interest rate charged. The results show a strong association between interest rates and levels of financial performance, with varying effects across types of institutions. For NBFIs, the coefficient for gross portfolio yield is positive and statistically significant across all measures of profitability used in this study (i.e., financial self-sufficiency, operational self-sufficiency, and return on assets). It indicates that specialized microfinance institutions tend to be more profitable when their average interest rate is higher.
Conversely, the results for financial cooperatives show that raising interest rates results in reduced financial performance, which rejects the hypothesis that claims similar effects of interest rates on financial performance across microfinance institution forms. The coefficients of financial cooperatives are negative and significant across all profitability indicators, signifying that increasing interest rates does not result in improved financial performance for these institutions. This result remain the same after we sum the coefficients for yield and yield interactions, which further marked an inverse and significant relationship between interest rates and profitability for financial cooperatives, even after controlling for costs and depth of outreach. This result can be because well-functioning cooperatives 18 have less incentive to increase returns, as their motive is, in principle, not profit maximization.
18 Our presumption with regard to this inverse relationship between profitability and yield is that financial cooperatives strive for higher interest rates while they are poorly performing and vise versa. Note: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. a Capital cost is the sum of rent and transportation expenses and depreciation.
Tab. 2 -Gross portfolio yield and financial performance
As noted above, we also look at the effect of costs on financial performance in the same model. The results show that higher capital costs are associated with reduced financial performance in two of our profitability indicators. The capital cost coefficient is negative and significant, which suggests that containing those costs (i.e., rent, transportation, depreciation, etc.) is a key to the profitability of microfinance providers.
Labor costs also tend to be inversely and strongly related with profitability in our specifications of financial and operational self-sufficiency -its coefficient is negative and statistically significant. In a similar way, this result suggests that containing labour costs is associated with improved financial performance. In particular, an unreported specification that allowed the effects of capital and labour costs to vary by organizational form exclusively showed that containing labour cost and capital costs are key to improved financial performance among financial cooperatives and NBFIs, respectively. Overall, the coefficients on the cost indicators suggest that cost efficiency or cost containment play a crucial role in determining the profitability of microfinance providers.
After permitting the effects of interest rates to vary by organizational form, the financial cooperatives dummy introduced independently also explains additional variation in financial performance. Across all measures of profitability, the coefficient for the financial cooperatives dummy is positive and statistically significant. In terms of financial performance, microfinance providers that are member owned outperform the specialized NBFI microfinance institutions.
Age of the institution, the variable that controls for experience, is negatively associated with financial performance. Older microfinance providers were expected to be more profitable, as they can develop efficiency through experience. However, the alternative hypothesis that holds in our case is also plausible, as more recently established microfinance providers could also learn from the existing knowledge accumulated by their antecedents at lower costs. Moreover, costs of older microfinance institutions can also rise as they try to reach beyond their initial target clients to those that are more isolated and difficult to reach -the correlation matrix indicates that breadth increases with age (Table A2) . Size of institutions, a control for scales of operation, is significantly positively linked with financial performance. It suggests that large microfinance institutions are more profitable, as they benefit from economies of scale or from the potential intensity of larger assets over a larger client base with diverse risks.
Controls for depth of outreach indicate mixed results. Average loan size is positively linked with financial performance (although not significant so), suggesting smaller loans are, on average, less profitable. Serving more women tend to be linked with improved financial performance. The coefficient of percentage of women borrowers is positive and statistically significant in the first two measures of profitability. Length of outreach, among the six aspects of outreach proposed by Schreiner (2002) , is also positively associated with financial performance. Microfinance providers with longer and repeated client relationships are more profitable than those offering one time or less repetitive loans. The regional dummy variables at the bottom of Table 2 also explain some variation in financial performance. The results show that microfinance providers operating in Amhara and Oromia region do better than microfinance providers operating in Addis Ababa and other regions 19 in terms of financial self-sufficiency, operational self-sufficiency, and return on assets.
The results summarized in Table 3 further extend the analysis of interest rates and profitability indicated above to examine the implications of high enough interest rates on financial performance. Charging exorbitant interest rates by microfinance providers to offset higher costs of information and enforcement is not uncommon. Based on agency theory, our hypothesis is that charging very high interest rates above a certain threshold could result in problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. This is because of possible low repayment rates and less demand for expensive loans. Hypothetically, high interest rates drive worthy borrowers out of the market and only risky borrowers would find it in their interest to borrow, which in turn may results in low repayment rates and profitability (Morduch, 1999) . The relationship with demand is straightforward -high interest rates can reduce demand, as it crowd out safe borrowers (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2010; Stiglitz, 1990) . If these assertions are true, microfinance providers in our sample charging comparatively higher interest rates should experience lower financial performance.
We examine the implications of relatively high interest rates on financial performance by including the quadratic term of gross portfolio yield in our profitability specification given under equation (2). We also allow the association between the squared portfolio yield and profitability to vary by organizational form, as was done in the previous estimation. As shown in Table 3 , for NBFIs, the relationship between interest rates and financial performance follows the hypothetical predictions. Both the linear yield and quadratic yield coefficients are statistically significant in our two measures of profitability, with positive and negative signs, respectively. This indicates that financial and operational self-sufficiency for NBFIs increases with portfolio yield, but only up to a certain point at which the negative quadratic yield coefficient outweigh the positive linear yield coefficient. Figure 3 -(a) shows the pattern of this relationship between interest rates and financial self-sufficiency for NBFIs based on the estimation from Table 3 , column 1. Consistent with theoretical predictions, levels of financial selfsufficiency increase with yield up to a point and, as interest rates exceed about 25 percent per annum, the curve start trending down 20 .
For financial cooperatives, the coefficients for linear yield and quadratic yields are the opposite sign of those for NBFIs. Similar to the results of the base regression, the linear portfolio yield coefficient is negative and significant before and after summing the yield and yield interaction coefficient, signifying an inverse relationship between interest rates and financial performance. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that associates relatively high interest rates with lower financial performance for financial cooperatives, since the quadratic yield coefficient is not statistically significant (although it is positive). In all, as far as financial cooperatives are concerned, any relative increase of interest rates have a decreasing effect on financial performance. Figure 3 -(b) shows the pattern of this relationship between interest rates and financial self-sufficiency for financial cooperatives based on the estimation from Note: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. a Capital cost is the sum of rent and transportation expenses and depreciation.
Source: Authors' calculations, based on primary data collected between April and June 2012. Note: Both of the graphs are from specification 1 of Table 3 .
In summary, the results from the specification that permits for non-linear effects of interest rates on financial performance (Table 3 ) suggest a negative association between financial performance and relatively higher interest rates. NBFIs that charge higher interest rates above the threshold are less profitable than those who charge relatively lower rates. For financial cooperatives, on the other hand, charging lower interest rates tends to be strongly linked with improved financial performance. The signs and levels of significance of other cost and outreach control variables remain similar to the base profitability regression.
We next extend the analysis to further examine the implications of cost of loans on financial performance. As indicated above, the higher interest rates charged by microfinance providers often are ascribed to the high lending costs associated with small loans. Based on the results of our base profitability regression and theoretical predictions, here we put forward cost reduction as an alternative solution to achieve improved profitability. Microfinance institutions that are able to dispense with information and enforcement costs through cost reduction mechanisms can at the same time overcome loss of demand and repayment problems that might arise from the prescription of higher interest rates. If this conjecture is true, microfinance providers in our sample that contained their costs of lending should be more profitable than others. Note: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.
For NBFIs, the estimated coefficient for financial self-sufficiency (our measure of financial performance) clearly suggests that cost containment is strongly related to improved financial performance. The results in Table 4 show that financially selfsufficient NBFIs are estimated to have 28 percent lower costs per unit of currency lent than others within the same group that are not financially self-sufficient. Although less in magnitude, when we sum FSS and FSS interaction coefficients, the effects of costs of loans on financial performance is also negative and significant for financial cooperatives, indicating that cost containment results in profitability. Self-sufficient financial cooperatives are estimated to have 0.3 percent 21 lower costs per unit of currency lent than financial cooperatives that are not financially viable. Moreover, the financial cooperative dummy indicates that, as a whole, cooperative lenders outperformed NBFIs in cost reduction 22 . Financial cooperative are estimated to have 41 percent lower costs per unit of currency lent compared to NBFIs, with the difference being statistically significant.
Experience measured in terms of age of the institution has effects on capital cost and labour costs of similar magnitude, which offset its effect on total cost of loans. More experienced microfinance providers in our sample tend to reduce labour costs, but face higher capital costs per unit of currency lent. The coefficient for size suggests that large asset bases can reduce costs of lending (although insignificant). Neither outreach indicators nor controls for location are significantly linked to cost of loans.
. Outreach
Outreach is the customary matrix used to measure microfinance social performance and includes breadth, depth, scope and length of lender's product (Schreiner, 2002) . The breadth of microfinance providers in our sample is encouraging. On average, each microfinance provider extends services to about 19, 915 individual borrowers. However, when we disaggregate lenders by organizational type, the coverage of NBFIs is show to be much wider. Each of the NBFIs on average extends financial services for about 70, 397 23 individuals, while financial cooperatives are very limited in their breadth of outreach -on average they serve about 247 individuals. This, however, does not mean that the coverage of financial cooperatives is very tiny in the country as a whole. As they are very large in number (i.e., about 8,000), the number of individuals served by financial cooperatives in total is comparable to that of the NBFIs' clients.
From the descriptive statistics, we understand that NBFIs do better than financial cooperatives in terms of depth of outreach, as measured by average loan sizes and percentage of women borrowers. Woman borrowers constitute 58 percent of NBFIs total clients, and, on average, their average loan size is small at 46 percent of the regional income per capita. Financial cooperatives, on the other hand, extend loan with average sizes equivalent to the regional income per capita, and their female borrowers account for only 40 percent of their total members. However, financial cooperatives are in better position in terms of length of outreach. On average, they have more than eight years of a repeated borrowing relationship with their members, compared to five years of average client relationship in the case of NBFIs. Overall, microfinance providers in our sample extend a loan size equals to 95 percent of regional income per capita and female borrowers account 45 percent of their total clients/members.
22 This result is consistent with prior work by Mersland (2008) and theoretical predictions. While cost of ownership can be higher, cooperatives are effective in mitigating the cost of market constraints or contracts (Hansmann, 1996) . Such mitigation of market costs is highly relevant for the issue at hand, since MFIs in Ethiopia operate in an inefficient financial market. 23 It should be noted that this figure on average breadth of NBFIs is influenced by three to four big microfinance institutions that are partly owned by regional public bodies. The median size of active borrowers is rather 10,592 and there are NBFIs with less than 200 active borrowers.
We next look into the implications of depth of outreach (measured in terms of average loan size per regional income per capita) on cost of lending. Understanding the extent to which lowering loan sizes to the needs of the poor reduces financial viability by increasing average costs is the issue we raise at this point (i.e., the cost -loan size trade-off). Note: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. a Capital cost includes rent, transportation and depreciation (i.e., all administrative costs, except personnel or labor costs). b Labor cost includes all expense for personnel (i.e., salary, plus per diem).
Source: Authors' calculations, based on primary data collected between April and June 2012. Table 5 presents estimated coefficients from a regression that correlates the total cost per unit of currency lent to average loan sizes of microfinance providers in our sample. We also include quadratic average loan size to capture non-linear effects and allow loan size indicators to vary by organizational form. For the interpretation of the results that follows, we concentrate on column (2) of Table 5 .
While the magnitude varies across organizational form, the estimated coefficient for average loan size indicates that large loan sizes are associated with lower average costs, but only up to a certain point. For NBFIs, the linear and quadratic loan size coefficients are negative and positive, respectively, with statistical significance. As shown in Table 5 column (2) and Figure 4 , for NBFIs, relatively larger loan sizes are estimated to have 43 percent average lower costs per unit of currency lent up to a loan sizes equivalent to regional income per capita. Loan sizes above the regional income per capita are estimated to have 21 percent average higher costs per unit of currency lent. Note: The graph is from specification 2 of Table 4 . Source: Authors' calculations, based on primary data collected between April and June 2012.
When we sum up the linear and quadratic terms, the effect of loan sizes on loan costs turns out to be the same for financial cooperatives as for NBFIs, but is much smaller in magnitude. However, the organizational dummy introduced independently indicates that financial cooperatives perform well in cost containments, even after controlling for average loan sizes. The estimated coefficient suggests that microfinance providers in our sample that are financial cooperatives have a 33 percent average lower costs per unit of currency lent compared to NBFIs.
Outreach and financial performance: Is there a trade-off?
The outreach to financial performance trade-off is an issue that has received attention from all observers (including policy makers) who are concerned about the social performance of microfinance providers. The concern largely emanates from proposition that asserts that focus on financial performance can crowd out the small loans demanded by the poor, as they are costly to service. Recently, the issue become more pressing following the growing commercialization, competition, and regulation in the microfinance industry that affected the way microfinance institutions do business and resulted in a shift in performance assessment criteria (Christen, 2001; Rhyne and Otero, 2006) . Traditionally, the development impact of microfinance providers was assessed based on outreach as measured by breadth or depth (e.g., loan size, fraction of women to total clients, etc.). Institutions were considered successful if they expanded outreach to the poor (Robinson 2001; Yaron et al., 1997) .
Currently, however, expanding outreach per se does not mean triumph over poverty.
To be considered successful, a microfinance institution should provide durable and propoor financial services on a cost-covering basis. The later criterion opens the new debates mentioned above on the potential compatibility or trade-off of the two bottomlines -outreach and financial sustainability. As noted before, there are few systematic empirical works that examine the trade-off of outreach to the poor and financial sustainability and the evidence that has been developed is mixed (Bassem, 2012; Cull et al., 2007; Haremes et al., 2011; Quayes, 2011) . In this section, we further investigate this issue to understand possible varying effects of outreach to the poor on financial performance by organizational form. Table 6 summarizes the results on the outreach to financial performance trade-off estimated following equation (4), which associates financial self-sufficiency with various measures of outreach to the poor. While the unreported specification for the whole sample and the simple correlation shows that outreach is not significantly associated with financial self-sufficiency 24 , varying and strong evidences emerged when we allow the estimation to vary by organization form.
As shown in column 1 of Table 6 , the coefficient for financial self-sufficiency corresponding to NBFIs is positive and statistically significant for the average loan size variable, indicating that NBFIs that are financially self-sufficient are those that extend relatively large size loans. The negative and significant coefficient for women borrowers in column 2 of Table 6 also suggests that NBFIs that are self-sufficient are less focused on women borrowers. Moreover, NBFIs that are financially sustainable tend to provide loans with limited scope of outreach -they offer loans with relatively extended installment periods that are less demanded by poor clients 25 . In all, the coefficients for NBFIs across our measures of outreach marked the presence of trade-off between financial self-sufficiency and outreach to the poor. In other words, the result suggests that NBFIs lend small size loans and serve more women borrowers face higher costs that eventually affect their financial viability.
On the other hand, the coefficients of financial self-sufficiency for financial cooperatives turn out to have the opposite signs to those for NBFIs in all measures of outreach. The estimated coefficient for financial self-sufficiency for average loan size is negative and statistically significant, indicating a positive complementary relationship between outreach to the poor and financial viability. While financial cooperatives overall did not cater more to women borrowers compared to NBFIs, the positive and significant coefficient for percentage of woman borrowers both before and after summing with the interaction term concurrently marked a harmony between outreach and financial selfsufficiency for cooperatives that are financially self-sufficient. It indicates that financially self-sufficient cooperatives serve higher fractions of women borrowers as compared to their counter-parts, implying greater depth of outreach along with financial sustainability.
As shown in the last column of Table 6 , time between loan repayment schedule is positively linked with financial performance for both NBFIs and cooperative lenders that are financially self-sufficient (although less in magnitude and marginally insignificant for financial cooperatives). This results show that less frequent repayment schedules results in improved financial performance. This can be due to diminution of transaction costs. However, the welfare consequences of less frequent repayment schedules for borrowers are not clear cut. On the one side, given the presumed liquidity constraints of the typical microfinance clients, less frequent repayment can be pro-poor (wider in scope of outreach), as it does not require borrowers to have smooth income throughout the period. On the other side, more frequent loan repayment schedules can reduce the burden of one lump sum repayment for borrowers and therefore reduce potential defaults and delinquencies by inculcating fiscal disciplines. If the first conjecture is true, financial cooperatives are better in scope of outreach, as they provide loan terms with extended time between installments compared to NBFIs.
Besides the commonly accepted measures of outreach, we estimate the effect of catering to rural borrowers on financial performance, as serving the rural poor may involve additional costs. However, the results in column 3 of Table 6 show that percentage of rural borrowers is not significantly linked with financial self-sufficiency, irrespective of organizational form. What we found is that, as compared to NBFIs client compositions by territory, a considerable proportion of clients served by financial cooperatives are from rural areas. Note: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.
Additional trends that vary by organizational form also emerged from the controls of experience and scale. For NBFIs, we found no new evidence on the relationship between experience and institutional size on outreach indicators, with the exceptions of positive effects of age and size on the proportion of rural borrowers and scope of outreach, respectively. The significant positive coefficient for age and institutional size before and after summing up with respective interaction terms in the specification of average loan size indicates that experienced and large financial cooperatives do relatively poorly in outreach -large and experienced financial cooperatives have larger average loan sizes. In this case, progressive lending, increasing loan sizes based on repayment records and with passage of time, can be at play. However, with the cross-sectional data at hand we cannot identify the effects of progressive lending and possible shifts in the composition of new members on average loan sizes as the institutions grow older, a phenomena which is common in microfinance.
The results on other variables accounted for in the specification are consistent with our predictions. On women borrowers, the positive and statistically significant coefficient of donation over loan portfolio indicates that donated microfinance providers in our sample tend to cater more to women borrowers. Their proportions of women borrowers are 23 percent higher than those of self-standing microfinance institutions. NGO-owned microfinance institutions, on the other hand, cater more to rural clients as compared to investor-and state-owned institutions. Furthermore, the significant negative and positive coefficient for the number of sources of capital in the specification of average loan size and percentage of women borrowers, respectively, suggests that microfinance providers with diversified sources of capital tend to focus on poor and women borrowers.
Overall, the evidence that emerged in this section clearly shows varying relationships between outreach to the poor and financial performance by organizational form. After controlling for experience and scale of operation, NBFIs that are financially selfsufficient perform poorly in outreach to the poor, signifying a tension between outreach and financial performance. In contrast, financially self-sufficient cooperatives perform well and are able to balance or achieve their dual objectives. The results show a positive complementary relationship between outreach and financial self-sufficiency for financial cooperatives. These results significantly mark the crucial role of organizational form in microfinance delivery. Specifically, it indicates that organizational form (with their differences in cost containment) matters most towards fulfilling the full promise of microfinance and achieving the double bottom-lines -serving the poor with financial sustainability.
Conclusions
From the early 19 th century to the present, microfinance institutions have evolved as providers of customized financial services to the needy excluded by conventional banks. Through their innovative institutional arrangements and contract terms, they have overcome the high costs of market contracts and achieved high loan repayment rates, even in places where credit markets are inefficient. Financial cooperatives and specialized microfinance institutions are typical models that disprove the traditional assumption that the poor are neither creditworthy nor able to save. They largely demonstrate that the poor can be bankable -the poor can borrow, pay substantial rates of interest, and save continuously. Nonetheless, their efforts used often to be backed by substantial subsidies in recognition of the costs involved in micro lending and their poverty focus. Providing financial services to the poor on cost-covering basis is a challenge that remains for most microfinance institutions.
Recently, however, growing commercialization and competition in the microfinance industry has driven a shift from reliance on subsidies to achieving financial sustainability -a goal that can be in conflict with outreach, as it requires the ability to cover costs out of the income generated, while serving the poor. The relevant policy question is, thus, whether and to what extent shifting the focus towards achieving financial self-sufficiency has impinged on outreach to the poor. Outreach and financial sustainability can be either complementary if the focus on financial viability attracts commercial funds, which at the same time contributes to expand outreach. Or it can be conflicting if it crowds out small loans that are often demanded by the poor, as they are costly to service.
Using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression that allows variables of interests to vary by organizational types on data disaggregated by types of microfinance providers in Ethiopia, our study analyzed the implication of the pursuit for financial viability on outreach. We specifically compare financial cooperatives and NBFIs in their outreach, financial performance, and cost-efficiency and address whether and to what extent these two forms of organization vary in their ability to achieve financial self-sufficiency together with outreach to the poor. We used a census of all NBFIs and a selection of financial cooperatives based on their audit status.
The results obtained from the analysis show that the effects of interest rates, potential compatibility or trade-off between outreach and financial sustainability, and costefficiency largely depends on organizational form. We find the NBFIs that charge higher interest rates are more financially self-sufficient than others, but only up to a certain point. Consistent with theoretical predictions, charging interest rates higher than the threshold results in lower profitability. For financial cooperatives, on the other hand, lower interest rates are linked with improved financial performance. We presume that their better performance in cost containment found in our cost of loans analysis could justify the profitability of financial cooperatives even when charging lower interest rates. The results also suggest that financial cooperatives charging higher interest rates are less profitable, indicating the extent of social compulsions and agency costs involved.
The evidence that emerged on the compatibility or trade-off of outreach to the poor and financial self-sufficiency, the primary issue we sought to address in this paper, also varies by organizational type. We find tensions between outreach and financial performance for NBFIs. The results obtained indicates that NBFIs lend small size loans and more to women borrowers, which are often taken to imply depth of outreach, but they face high costs that affect their financial viability. In contrast, the results show a positive complementary relationship between outreach and financial performance for financial cooperatives. On average, financially self-sufficient cooperative lend small size loans, serve larger fractions of women borrowers, charge lower interest rates, and reduce cost of loans compared to their counter-parts that operate below the costcovering line.
Generally, the results suggest that the organizational form of microfinance providers has implications on financial sustainability and outreach. NBFIs perform well in breadth and depth of outreach, but face higher costs, which strikes a tension between outreach and financial performance. On the other hand, with relative less breadth, financial cooperative are cost-efficient and earn better income after covering the costs incurred in serving the poor. Though it is probable that the development of financial market with a mixture of organizational or ownership form would best serve the clients, based on our findings, financial cooperatives better contain costs, balance the social and economic goals of microfinance, and enable the microfinance industry to fulfill its full promise -serving the poor on a cost-covering basis. Note: * significant at below 10%.
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